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Central to the environmental and health hazards created by the expanding 
use of pesticides in developing countries is the weakness of national 
regulatory agencies. International efforts to support these institutions 
include the establishment of a Hazard Audit Organization to assess the 
pesticide industry's adherence to accepted standards of health and envi- 
ronmental protection. An independent evaluation by a hazard auditor 
may be attractive to all parties in the long-standing confrontation over 
the control of pesticide technology: the industry, public interest groups, 
developing and developed countries, and international agencies. One 
approach to implementing the concept is proposed and initial responses to 
the proposal are reported. 
The papers presented at this symposium join a growing body of evidence of 
the effect on human health and the environment caused by the rapid increase 
in pesticide use in developing countries. Chemicals of sometimes extreme 
human or environmental toxicity are transported, stored, used, and discarded 
in ways that expose people and other nontarget organisms to significant 
hazard. 
The urgent need for effective regulation of these hazards, however, contrasts 
starkly with national capacity, which is limited in much of the Third World. 
More than 50% of developing countries have no legislation enabling govern- 
ment to regulate the marketing of pesticides or limit their availability to 
particular areas or users; in Africa, the proportion is 76% (FAO 1989). Even 
where adequate legislation exists, regulatory agencies are often unable to 
assess pesticide hazards in light of local conditions or to enforce the decisions 
they reach, because of a lack of qualified personnel, inadequate resources, or 
interference. 
166 
Current initiativ6s, at the international level, aimed at improving this state of 
affairs are discussed in this paper. A novel approach, the concept of a "pesti- 
cide hazards auditor," who would build upon and supplement these initia- 
tives has been promoted over the last year with support from the Interna tional 
Development Research Centre (IDRC). Initial reactions to this proposal from 
developing and developed countries, international agencies, the pesticide 
industry and consumer, environmental, and labour groups are described. 
International initiatives 
Technical assistance and information exchange 
A number of bilateral and multilateral aid organizations have launched pro- 
grams aimed at increasing the skills and resources available to pesticide 
regulatory agencies in developing countries. The Food and Agriculture Orga- 
nization (FAO), United Nations Environmental Program (IJNEP), the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and Germany's Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), among 
others, are providing training, analytical equipment, information systems, 
continuing support in the evaluation of risks and benefits, and advice on 
legislative reform. In several cases, as in FAO's programs in the Far East and 
Africa, this assistance is organized on a regional basis. The task, however, is 
immense; fewer than one-quarter of developing countries claim to have 
received any technical assistance (FAQ 1989). 
A major cause of concern is the international trade in highly toxic pesticides, 
particularly the export to developing countries of products banned or severely 
restricted in the country of manufacture. The USA, UK, and the European 
Community have instituted schemes to notify importing countries of ship- 
ments of unregistered or severely restricted pesticides. In practice, notifica- 
tions are often received well after the pesticides have arrived and do little to 
enable importing countries to control hazardous imports (Pallernaerts 1988). 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with support from many develop- 
ing countries, have mounted a determined lobbying effort within the govern- 
ing councils of FAO and UNEP in favour of more restrictive schemes based on 
the principle of "prior informed consent" (PlC), whereby a designated author- 
ity in the importing country must explicitly agree to the import before it can 
take place (Anon. 1990a). Late in 1989, both organizations adopted comple- 
mentary PlC procedures, after first refusing to do so. The Commission of the 
European Community is currently considering a draft directive that would 
incorporate PlC into European law (T. Casey, Consultant to the Directorate- 
General for the Environment, Commission of the European Community, June 
1990, personal communication) and the proposed Pesticide Export Reform Act 
would do the same in the USA (Anon. 1990b). 
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Although PlC, as operated by FAO and UNEP, will extend to many of the 
pesticides that have been implicated most often in human poisoning, the 
degree to which it will actually improve the regulation of such hazards is open 
to question. Pesticides banned or severely restricted by 10 or more countries 
will be the first to be covered by the scheme, followed, probably in late 1990, 
by those so treated by five or more countries. Thereafter, substances labeled 
"banned or severely restricted" in a decision by any additional country will 
be included. A working group will determine whether formulations based on 
WHO class IA (extremely hazardous) compounds should be covered as well 
(Anon. 1990a). A recent report by the British-based Pesticides Trust (1989) 
contends, however, that several class lB (highly hazardous) pesticides that 
have frequently been involved in poisoning incidents may escape the 
informed consent provisions. 
The scheme hinges on a government's ability to evaluate and act on the notices 
it receives, and it is precisely this capacity that is deficient in many instances. 
As well, PlC begins with the decisions industrialized countries have taken to 
protect health and the environment within their own jurisdictions. Industry 
has often claimed that a different balance of risks and benefits may lead 
developing countries to judge acceptable a number of pesticides strictly 
controlled in industrialized countries (Willis 1986). 
The argument works as well, however, in the other direction, e.g., the appli- 
cation methods and worker protection typical in much of the Third World may 
result in operators being dangerously exposed when using products not 
subject to any significant restriction in industrialized countries. These deter- 
minations can only be made in the light of local conditions, emphasizing once 
again the need for effective national regulation. 
The drafting of the International code of conduct on the distribution and use of 
pesticides (FAO 1986) is another major initiative that addresses the weakness 
of pesticide regulation in developing countries. The code calls on the pesticide 
industry at all levels, as well as exporting nations, international agencies, and 
public-sector organizations to assume a share of responsibility for ensuring 
safety in the use of pesticides. The code's provisions are entirely voluntary and 
there has been considerable controversy over the extent to which they are 
respected in practice. 
Two reports (ELC 1987; Pesticides Trust 1989) prepared for the Pesticides 
Action Network (an international group of NGOs) allege widespread infringe- 
ments of the Code, for the most part by industry, in all developing countries 
investigated. Evidence is presented regarding misleading advertising, inap- 
propriate packaging, poor quality control, and marketing of banned and 
dangerous products. Governments in developing countries also cite wide- 
spread failure by industry, as well as other parties, to abide by the Code's 
provisions (FAO 1989). In response to these findings, the FAO Conference has 
asked the Director-General to report by next year on the feasibility of trans- 
forming the Code into a convention that governments could make legally 
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binding within their jurisdictions. Effective enforcement of such legislation, 
however, would come up against both the vague wording of many of the 
Code's provisions and, once again, the limited resources available to Third 
World governments. 
The industry perspective 
At Ciba-Geigy Ltd, a principal pesticide manufacturer, the FAO Code is 
accepted apparently without reservation and has been incorporated into the 
Agriculture Division's quality policy (Anon. 1988a). It is seen as being consis- 
tent with the principle of "product stewardship," which entails continual 
monitoring and periodic internal audits (Anon. 1988b). 
The true measure of corporate commitment to these policies and principles is 
in their application, particularly in cases where there may be conflict with 
short-term profitability. Ciba—Geigy claims, in several instances, to have vol- 
untarily refrained from marketing products where evidence suggested that 
they could not be safely used (as required under section 5.2.3 of the Code). For 
example, chiordimeform (Galecron) was removed from the Latin American 
market following reports of poisoning; dichlorvos (Nuvan) and phosphami- 
don (Dimecron) were considered too toxic for agricultural application in the 
Philippines and Burkina Faso, respectively. 
Officers of the company point to a range of initiatives aimed at reducing risks 
to health and the environment, including improvements in formulations and 
packaging and an increased emphasis on safety training. Progress is slow but 
continual, they say, yet little credit is given to these efforts by the company's 
critics. 
Pesticide hazard auditor 
Crisis and opportunity 
The pesticides industry finds itself under increasing pressure from national 
authorities, international bodies, and environmental and consumer groups 
(GIFAP n.d.). Its public image has suffered from a series of widely publicized 
disasters (Seveso, Bhopal, and the Rhine), as well as from more localized crises, 
such as the contamination of groundwater in Italy's Po valley. 
An alternative to confrontation may be found in an historical analogy. By the 
late 18th century, there had emerged in Britain a large number of common-law 
corporations engaged in commerce and manufacturing. A highly speculative 
and unregulated market in corporate stocks developed, leading to several 
spectacular financial failures. Investors and creditors led the resulting public 
demand for investigation, which required the services of independerfl accoun- 
tants. By the early 19th century, it had become common practice to call upon 
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such skilled outsiders to assist in settling disputes and bankruptcies and, 
increasingly, to attest to the soundness of enterprises seeking investment or 
credit. It is to these developments, given legal support in 1844, that the 
Anglo-American tradition of independent financial auditing can be traced 
(Anderson 1984). 
The recent trend in the United States toward "environmental auditing" 
appears to have a similar history. A growing number of firms whose activities 
may give rise to pollution and occupational-health hazards have retained 
independent environmental auditors to help ensure compliance with regula- 
tory standards and to oversee internal auditing procedures. Once again, the 
need of companies to maintain investor and creditor confidence and to safe- 
guard their public images appears to have been as crucial in this decision as 
court-sanctioned or regulatory requirements (Palmisano 1989) 
Companies producing and marketing pesticides in developing countries 
should have their practices, with regard to impact on health and the environ- 
ment, examined by an independent pesticide-hazards auditor. To the extent 
that a company's good name or image has value in a competitive environment, 
a hazard auditor might help create a market-based mechanism for ensuring 
compliance with accepted standards that would reinforce official regulation. 
For the system to gain acceptance in the industry, it must embody certain 
characteristics: 
• Independence — the auditor must be seen to have no link, direct or 
indirect, with the company being examined. 
• Authoritativeness — the audit must be based on explicit and recognized 
standards, as have been codified for financial auditing in the form of 
generally accepted accounting principles. The FAO Code (FAO 1986) is 
subscribed to by all parties and might provide one of the bases for 
defining acceptable corporate practice with respect to pesticide hazards. 
• Expertise — the individuals performing the audit must inspire confi- 
dence by their demonstrated technical knowledge and mastery of the 
standards underlying the hazard audit. 
• Openness — while respecting proprietary and commercial information 
whose disclosure might prejudice a company's interests, the detailed 
and material conclusions of the auditor must be made public if its 
function is to be fulfilled. Similarly, the company must be prepared to 
make available to the auditor all relevant documents and records. 
• Service — beyond assessing a company's compliance with accepted 
standards, a financial auditor often provides advice on internal auditing 
procedures. Similarly, the hazard auditors would make a more useful 
contribution (and not only to the company) if they suggested changes 
in, say, a company's environmental- and health-monitoring programs 
that would enable problems to be identified earlier. 
170 
Benefits of a hazard auditor 
From the company's perspective, a positive and unqualified attestation from 
the hazard auditor would provide authoritative confirmation that the com- 
pany was acting on the high standards to which it laid claim. This would help 
reassure the increasingly restive society within which agrochemical compa- 
flies operate and at the same time serve to differentiate the firm from less 
responsible competitors. 
Among developing countries, those whose national regulation is the weakest 
would stand to benefit most from a hazard audit. The audit would provide an 
immediate form of control of pesticide hazards, based on the application of 
broadly accepted principles to the local context in which the products are 
marketed and used. In no sense, however, should the hazard auditor be seen 
as substituting for national regulation over the longer term. 
A financial audit, in most industrialized countries, is sanctioned by law and 
backed by administrative and legal measures that ensure compliance with 
accepted norms. Either form of audit, financial or hazard, relies on market 
forces and corporate self-interest to raise and maintain an industry's stan- 
dards. Internal and external audits may lessen the requirements for gov- 
ernment enforcement, benefiting developing countries with operational, if 
constrained, regulatory systems. However, public supervision is still essential 
to ensure that these mechanisms function efficiently. 
For NGOs and their allies on one hand and the pesticides industry and its 
supporters on the other, the hazard audit may represent one element of a 
solution to a long-running conflict that, for both, has absorbed considerable 
energy and resources. 
Implementing the concept 
Initial steps 
A description of the hazard audit (Loevinsohn 1989) was sent to some 150 
organizations on all sides of the debate. The concept was further discussed at 
two scientific conferences and in meetings with some of the major organiza- 
tions. The response has been generally positive. A meeting of representatives 
of the main sectors has been suggested to explore in greater detail whether a 
consensus is attainable and to chart further action. 
Participants at such a meeting could discuss its outcome in their respective 
constituencies and, if general agreement is obtained, working groups could 
be formed to define "accepted standards," develop procedures for the audit 
teams, and prepare a draft charter for a Hazard Audit Organization. The 
output of the working groups would be reviewed at a further meeting involv- 
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ing all major actors. At the same time, the concept would be given wider 
circulation through print and other media. 
Several case studies could be conducted to build confidence and gain experi- 
ence. These would take place in developing countries whose governments 
support the aims of the audit. 
If the studies were judged successful, the Hazard Audit Organization might 
be established by a substantial portion of companies in the industry, the major 
NGOs engaged in campaigning, and other groups representing the public. The 
support of influential governments in the North and South, key professional 
associations, and leading international bodies would also be essential. 
Structure and function 
An autonomous, nonprofit Hazard Audit Organization would have, as its 
primary task, external hazard audits of companies involved in the manufac- 
ture and sale of pesticides in developing countries. Financing would be 
provided by participating companies, the members, and the industry associ- 
ation, Groupement international des associations nationales de fabricants de 
produits agrochimiques (GIFAP), as well as firms outside this body. Compa- 
nies would be charged on a cost basis for each audit, but would also make 
annual contributions toward the organization's administrative expenses. 
General supervision, policy formulation, and the further development of 
"accepted standards" would be the responsibility of a governing council 
whose members would be drawn from four broad sectors: the pesticides 
industry; national regulatory agencies and international bodies (e.g., FAO, 
WHO, and UNEP); research institutions and professional associations; and 
consumer, producer, and environmental organizations. Relative proportions 
remain to be negotiated, but no sector should be allowed to dominate. A 
technical subcommittee would be responsible for planning and setting terms 
of reference for individual audits, selecting team members, and reviewing 
their reports. A small secretariat would also be required. Well-qualified audi- 
tors would be drawn from professional associations, international agencies, 
and national regulatory bodies in the North and South. Retained initially as 
consultants or on secondment, auditors might eventually be hired by the 
Hazard Audit Organization. 
Standards 
The FAO Code of Conduct (FAO 1986) may provide a framework of generally 
accepted principles on which to base the hazard audit, but in many respects 
the Code's provisions lack specificity. What, for example, constitutes "safe 
use" or an "unacceptable hazard"? An operational definition of these terms 
might be based on the practice of well-established regulatory agencies. A 
residue concentration or exposure level that falls within the range of what 
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different agencies take to be permissible can be said to be "generally accept- 
able." The variation in national tolerances to health hazards appears to be 
greatest with respect to chronic effects which, in statistical terms, arc often 
weak and uncertain. The consensus is generally clearer for acute effects in spite 
of the preeminent threat to populations in the Third World Ueyaratnam 1985). 
Procedures 
Rather than focus on one company's operations worldwide, the hazard audit 
might be conducted in one developing country at a time and involve all 
participating companies that do business there. In this way, it should be 
possible to cover several countries each year. Given the number of firms and 
the range of their activities, the auditors would have to rely on sampling 
techniques, as do financial auditors. The hazards entailed in different aspects 
of companies' operations might be stratified by severity and risk on the basis 
of published information, reports from government agencies and NGO 
groups, and the experience of the technical committee and auditors. Giving 
greatest weight to the most severe and probable hazards, a sample of practices 
would then be drawn and assessed in relation to the standards that had been 
defined. 
The audit team would examine company documents and facilities, interview 
employees, and investigate the distribution of products and the manner in 
which they were employed. Auditors would also consider information from 
regulatory bodies, research institutions, and producer, consumer, or environ- 
mental groups. Where it is deemed necessary, the team might undertake or 
commission research that would enable it to reach an informed opinion. 
Every effort would be made to ensure the active support of governments of 
the countries in which the audits are performed. The Hazard Audit Organiza- 
tion and host governments might work out different relations, according to 
the latter's needs and desires. Following their investigations, auditors would 
be well placed to report to the government on the effectiveness of national 
regulation and provide some advice on remedies, possibly focusing on aspects 
that the government had identified beforehand as problematic. An audit that 
covered perhaps several months would not, however, provide an opportunity 
for extensive technical assistance, although the team might make a useful 
contribution by identifying critical needs for other agencies to follow up. 
Reporfing 
The auditor's report would express a considered opinion regarding the extent 
of a company's adherence to accepted standards of conduct. Where deficien- 
cies were noted, the report would detail how practices should be improved to 
meet standards. This might entail, for example, changes in labeling, packag- 
ing, promotional material, educational programs, or restrictions on the avail- 
ability of the product in that market. 
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As suggested above, the auditor's report would be made public, except for 
commercially sensitive or proprietary information. At the company's 
dissemination might be delayed a few months to permit it to bring its practices 
into line with the recommendations. 
It is conceivable that, at some point, the conclusions of the auditor may conflict 
with the judgement of the national regulatory agency. For example, the former 
may find that a company should not be marketing a certain product, given 
pesticide practices in that even though the agency might have 
recently renewed the product's registration. The audit is of a company; it is 
not intended to limit a government's prerogative to evaluate risks as it sees fit. 
In the face of an auditor's public report, however, a decision to permit 
continued use would call for an alternative interpretation of the evidence or a 
demonstration of overriding benefits. In this way, the hazard auditor might 
serve to raise the standards of risk assessment and to open it to public scrutiny. 
Initial reactions 
Several dominant themes emerged among 58 written replies to the hazard 
auditor proposal (Loevinsohn 1990). Of the opinions expressed, 5 (9%) were 
negative and 53 (91%) were positive in varying degrees. 
Increase support to national regulatory 
The most widely voiced view (39% of the 49 detailed responses) was that 
greater emphasis should be placed on evaluating and assisting regulatory 
agencies. Some industry respondents felt that the focus on industry alone was 
unfair and others, from several sectors, thought the auditor's recommenda- 
tions would more likely be acted on if government was more closely involved 
in the process. 
An audit that puts developing country governments on the same footing as 
industry makes no sense; the weakness of national regulation is universally 
acknowledged and is the underlying rationale for initiatives such as the Code 
of Conduct and the pesticide hazard auditor. Although some assistance to 
national authorities might take place within or along with the audit, supported 
from nonindustry sources, there is a danger of overlap with existing or 
planned programs of agencies, such as FAO, were this function to take on a 
much greater significance. Closer integration with FAO is indeed a possibility 
and, in that context, the audit might extend to other sectors addressed by the 
Code of Conduct. 
Ensure the auditor's independence from industry 
The second most frequent comment (22% of the 49 detailed responses) con- 
cerned the danger of the hazard audit being dominated by the pesticides 
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industry and of its serving to legitimize pesticide use. Several respondents 
believed that these risks could only be avoided by complete financial auton- 
omy and by excluding industry representatives from the governing and 
technical bodies of the audit organization. 
Reasonable safeguards against domination should be built into the scheme. 
There would be justification, for example, in excluding company representa- 
tives from the technical committee where audits would be planned. Sanctions 
should be available against companies that, in their advertising or labeling, 
misconstrue audit results to imply an endorsement of their products. Funding 
from other sources could be sought to dilute the dependence on industry, but 
the self-financing character of the proposal is one of its chief attractions. Any 
attempt to exert undue influence would lead other sectors to withdraw their 
support from the scheme and lose companies the commercial benefit they 
derive from an independent audit. 
Furthermore, financing by industry is economically rational. An independent 
audit can legitimately be seen as part of the required to minimize 
the external costs to which pesticides give rise when they damage human 
health or the environment. Outside financing of the audit would amount to a 
subsidy, leading to greater use than if real costs were reflected in market price 
(Repetto 1985; Brader 1990) and distorting the choice between chemical-based 
pest control and alternative techniques. 
Emphasize the incentives 
for industry compliance 
A number of respondents suggested measures to increase the benefits to a 
company that agreed to be audited and implement the audit's recommenda- 
tions. These include proposing that multilateral and bilateral aid organiza- 
tions make a satisfactory audit report a requirement in their procurement 
programs. Developing country governments could similarly agree to pur- 
chase only from manufacturers who have received such an evaluation from 
the auditor. Governments might also make the external hazard audit a legal 
requirement, as is the case for financial audit in many countries. 
Measures such as these might indeed usefully increase incentives for compli- 
ance and penalize companies who remain outside the scheme to gain, for 
example, a price advantage. Additional incentives may be particularly import- 
ant to smaller manufacturers based in Third World countries where public 
opinion is often poorly informed. Many of these firms produce hazardous 
pesticides and are often not affiliated with national or international industry 
associations. 
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Increase collaboration with FAO and 
other United Nations agencies 
Several respondents wrote that, as the hazard auditor aims at improving 
compliance with accepted standards, particularly those embodied in the FAO 
Code of Conduct, a closer relation with FAO should be sought. Some ques- 
tioned the need for an independent audit organization. 
I investigated the possibility of an association with FAO and other United 
Nations (UN) agencies. Senior FAQ officials recognized the value of the 
auditor;particularly as a possible means to improve compliance with the Code 
should it become a convention made binding under national law. However, 
two difficulties were mentioned. FAQ, the officials declared, would not accept 
the financial link with industry that the proposal envisages. The other problem 
involves openness in reporting, which is crucial to the functioning of the audit 
mechanism. Because FAQ is responsible to its member governments, prob- 
lems might arise if it were to publish reports that were critical of national 
administrations. 
Similar concerns were voiced by officials of UNEP and WHQ. These con- 
straints might be loosened if there were widespread support for the innovation 
at the highest levels. However, the independence required of an external 
auditor would be more readily assured within an organization that is itself 
independent of the major actors. 
Conclusions 
The hazard auditor concept holds promise for improving the regulation of 
pesticide hazards in developing countries by creating a new market-based 
mechanism complementary to, and supportive of, national structures and 
international programs. It has already attracted widespread, if still provi- 
sional, support, but further progress toward implementing the concept will 
require collaboration among parties grown accustomed to confrontation. The 
proposal does not assume an congruency of interests among these parties, 
only that each side believe its interests are served by independent evaluation. 
Individual actors may conclude that the risks attendant on creating and 
operating this novel mechanism outweigh its benefits. It is not possible to 
predict the outcome of what will be a long process of negotiation. The prudent 
option, for all concerned, is to judge at each step whether the hazard auditor 
as it is emerging represents an improvement on what currently exists. 
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